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SELECTED PROBLEMS OF THE U. S. FOREIGN POLICY 
IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION AFTER 1989
Since the beginning of the 1990s Pacific has become much more important to the U. S. 
administration. The change of priorities was expressed by the first overseas journey of the 
newly appointed U. S. President G. W. H. Bush in 1989, when he chose to travel first to 
Asia instead of Europe. Having in mind the enormous growth of the Pacific Rim countries, 
as well as their human and territorial potential this dimension will be more and more 
important in the U. S. foreign policy. There are contrasting visions and interests of the U. S. 
in this region and lately we could have observed the U. S. tendencies to curtail the integra­
tion in the Pacific Basin. Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq resulted in reducing U. S. activity in 
the Asia-Pacific region, which entails the danger of limiting role of the United States in the 
region. It may result in U. S. exclusion from the East Asian integration process and endan­
ger its hegemonic position. After some clear signals the U. S. administration decided to 
counteract, and, as a result, we may observe President Bush’s proposal of creating Asia- 
Pacific Free Trade Area. 
The paper shortly presents U. S. priorities and relations with the most important actors 
of the region: China and Japan, regional alliances and American role in the regional orga­
nizations (especially APEC and ASEAN). 
Theoretical Approach
Looking at the U. S. strategies towards East Asia, we must consider at least two intellec­
tual traditions: realism and liberalism. 1 Realistic approach is visible in the policies of 
balance of power and containment, wars in Asia, and America’s military presence. It some­
1 These Iwo theoretical currents presented in this paper are definitely simplification. While analyzing 
theoretical approaches of the U. S. foreign policy in the 1990s, we may look at different classifications. One 
presented by H. Wiarda encompasses: conservative isolationism (Perrot, Buchanan), liberal isolationism, (rep­
resented by B. Clinton - focused on internal affairs, economy), conservative liberalism (A. Muravchik - main 
goal of the U. S. foreign policy should be a promotion of democracy), liberal idealism (supported by Clinton 
Administration - the U. S. should promote political goals, using economic tools), realism (the U. S. should not 
engage in idealistic crusades, but focus on protection of its own interests), interdependence (it links somehow 
all the aforementioned). All those currents were present in U. S. Policy towards Asia-Pacific. See: H. Wiarda, 
U. S. Foreign and Strategic Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: A Geopolitical Perspective, Westport: Green­
wood Press, 1996, pp. 5-8. 
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how reflects the hegemonic bargain with the East Asia: the U. S. provides security protec­
tion and access to its technology and markets. East Asian countries give in exchange 
a diplomatic, logistical and economic support for the U. S. led international order. 2 The 
liberal “grand strategy” is focused on three elements that generate stable order. These 
three elements are: to open up, tie down, and bind together. Opening up refers to using 
trade, investment, cultural exchange, and transnational society into the isolated countries 
with strong state rule. This concept has been strongly supported by the U. S. President Bill 
Clinton. Creating wealth and autonomy within the economy and society entails political 
pluralism. Tying down means encouraging governments to participate in international in­
stitutions, like the World Trade Organization, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, or 
the ASEAN Regional Forum (which seems to be the best example). Here one creates 
expectations and obligations for the governments through membership in regional and 
global institutions. Binding together relates to the creation of formal institutional links 
between countries that are potential adversaries, hence reducing the incentive to balance 
against each other. 3
2 See: G. J. Ikenberry, America in East Asia: Power, Markets, and Grand Strategy [in: ] E. Krauss, 
T. Pempel (eds), Beyond Bilateralism: U. S. -Japan Relations in the New Asia-Pacific, Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2004, pp. 41-42. 
3 The binding logic has been used in North Atlantic Treaty Organization, wherein we had the participation 
of France and Western Germany, similar logic stood behind the creation of European Coal and Steel Commu­
nity, see ibidem, pp. 42-44. 
4 See: G. Bush, B. Scowcroft, A World Transformed, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998, p. 91. 
5 J. Baker, America in Asia: Emerging Architecture for a Pacific Community, “Foreign Affairs, ” Winter 
1991/1992. 
U. S. priorities in the Asia-Pacific region
Till the end of the Cold War East Asia was the secondary battlefield while the most impor­
tant area for the U. S. foreign policy was Europe. The situation changed when George 
Walker Herbert Bush became the U. S. president in January 1989 and paid his first foreign 
visit to Asia. The administration, as National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft wrote, 
was seeking a pretext to go to China before the Soviet leader M. Gorbachev, who was 
supposed to go there in May. There was no reason, however, to justify such a visit till the 
death of the Japanese emperor Hirohito, who died in January. G. Bush decided to visit 
Beijing after Hirohito’s funeral and landed there on February 25th. It was a “signal of the 
new era’s priorities” for the administration since newly-appointed presidents used to go to 
Europe first. 4
Two years later, in 1991 James Baker, the then U. S. Secretary of State set forth the 
role of East Asia and the Pacific. He focused on the role of U. S. engagement in East Asia 
and the Pacific as vital to U. S. interests, for the region, but also to the international system 
the U. S. is trying to forge. J. Baker stressed U. S. defense commitments as the core of the 
Asia-Pacific security structure, but also signalized growing role and possibilities of Ameri­
can allies and friends in the region. Two main goals he mentioned were supporting demo­
cratic trends and helping to shape a framework for economic integration. 5 The U. S. was 
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realizing its interests as a Pacific Nation. This was expressed more clearly by W. Lord, 
Assistant Secretary of State for the Asia-Pacific in his statement before SFRC. “Today, no 
region in the world is more important for the United States than Asia and the Pacific. 
Tomorrow, in the 21st century, no region will be as important. [... ] We have enormous 
stakes in the Pacific. We need to integrate our economic, political, and security policies. 
We need fresh approaches and structures of cooperation. It is time to build - with others - 
a new Pacific community. ”6
6 W. Lord, Statement Before The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC., March 31, 
1993, U. S. Department of State Dispatch, vol. 4, no. 14, April 5, 1993. Available at: http: //dosfan. lib. uic. edu/ 
ERC/briefing/dispatch/1993/html/Dispatchv4no 14. html. 
7 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington 2006, p. 40. 
8 Ibidem. 
9 Commission formed by the scholars from Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard 
University, The Nixon Center, and RAND Corporation, among the members one could find Richard Armitage, 
Laura Donohue, Paul Krugman, John McCain, Condoleezza Rice, Pat Roberts, Brent Scowcroft. 
10 The Commission on America’s National Interests, America's National Interests, Washington 2000, 
p. 24. 
Looking at the U. S. National Security Strategy published in 2006, we may observe, 
the present priorities are similar. It states: “The United States is a Pacific nation, with 
extensive interests throughout East and Southeast Asia. The region’s stability and prosper­
ity depend on our sustained engagement: maintaining robust partnerships supported by 
a forward defense posture supporting economic integration through expanded trade and 
investment and promoting democracy and human rights. ”7 The document mentions crucial 
international institutions in the region, like the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 
the ASEAN Regional Forum, a U. S. -ASEAN Enhanced Partnership, the Six-Party Talks, 
or the Proliferation Security Initiative, but in addition it emphasizes the role of bilateral 
relations with the key states in the region as the foundation. 8
More detailed indications are to be found in the U. S. Report from the Commission on 
America’s National Interest. 9 The report mentions some vital interests like establishing 
productive relations with China, which is described as America’s major potential strategic 
adversary in East Asia and the survival of the two main American allies in the region 
South Korea and Japan. The latter should actively cooperate with the U. S. to resolve prob­
lems of the region and the world. Extremely important interests include maintenance of 
peace in the Taiwan Strait and on the Korean Peninsula as well as the reconciliation of 
China and Japan under the terms that America could benefit from. Important interests are 
connected with the movement of East Asian countries toward democracy and free markets, 
growing openness of East Asian markets to U. S. goods, services and investment and peaceful 
solution of the secondary territorial disputes (South China Sea, Senekaku Islands). 10
U. S. -Japanese relations
U. S. relations with Japan are perceived as the most important in the Asia-Pacific region 
and the U. S. -Japan alliance is a pivot of the U. S. based security architecture of the East 
Asia. The alliance is based on the San Francisco Peace Treaty (signed in 1951) and the 
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Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America 
(signed in I960). 11 Having the security guarantees from the U. S. and American military 
bases, Japan could focus on economic development. This approach, known as Yoshida 
Doctrine, has been present in Japanese foreign policy since the World War II. 12 During the 
Cold War era Japan was the closest U. S. security ally in the Asia-Pacific, serving, as 
Prime Minister Nakasone used to say “unsinkable aircraft carrier” off the coast of Asia. 13
11 The Treaty amended previous agreements (San Francisco 1951 and Tokyo 1952). It said “that an armed 
attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own 
peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional 
provisions and processes. ” It also allowed usage of Japanese land and facilities for U. S. military bases and 
purposes. See Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America. 
Available at: http: //www. mofa. go. jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/l. html. 
12 Even before the Treaty was signed Yoshida realized that it would be impossible for the United States to 
defend its numerous bases scattered throughout the home islands, without also defending Japan, see: M. Gallicchio, 
Japan in American Security Policy: A Problem in Perspective, Working Paper No. 10, National Security 
Archive. Available at: http: //www. gwu. edu/~nsarchiv/japan/gallicchiowp. htm. 
13 T. Pempel, Challenges to Bilateralism: Changing Foes, Capital Flows and Complex Forums [in: ] 
E. Krauss, T. Pempel (eds. ), op. cit., p. 6. 
14 See: R. Wampler, Japan and the United States, Part II: Diplomatic, Security, and Economic Relations, 
1977-1992, National Security Archive. Available at: http: //nsarchive. chadwyck. com/jap2_essay. htm. 
15 See: B. Stokes, Divergent Paths: U. S. -Japan Relations towards the Twenty-First Century, “Interna­
tional Affairs, ” vol. 72, no. 2, April 1996. 
16 Japan-U. S. Joint Declaration on Security - Alliance for the 21st Century, 17 April 1996. Available at: 
http: //www. mofa. go. jp/region/n-america/us/security/security. html. 
The beginning of the G. W. H. Bush’s administration faced new challenges in bilateral 
relations. The top priority was then trade issues, telecommunications, semiconductors, 
obstacles to U. S. bidding on Japanese public works projects, automobiles, efforts to obtain 
more access by U. S. firms to Japan’s banking and financial markets. The collapse of the 
Soviet Union was regarded as a removal of the rationale for U. S. -Japan security alliance. 
Another challenge was the first Gulf War. The U. S. expected Japanese support, whilst 
Japan had its interests in the Middle East (dependence on oil) and traditional pacifist mili­
tary culture as well as constitutional limits. Finally, the Kaifu Cabinet decided to send 
Japanese Self Defense Forces to join the coalition, but strictly to non-defense roles. Japan 
decided also to support the war financially. After the war ended trade issues broke out even 
stronger, both in Japan, and the U. S. 14
Till the mid-1990s we could obviously see the drift of the alliance. In 1994-1995 the 
U. S. and Japan stood on the brink of trade war and the future showed they’ll follow diver­
gent paths. 15 The Okinawa rape incident resulted in harsh attitudes of both societies. The 
situation changed dramatically after the Taiwan Strait Confrontation in 1996. It resulted 
in signing the U. S. -Japan Joint Security Declaration (April 1996). The U. S. and Japan 
focused on both bilateral security issues (the U. S. declared maintenance of 100, 000 de­
ployed military personnel in the region), role of the alliance in security of the Asia-Pacific 
Region, defense and R&D cooperation, and regional (role of China and Russia here was 
stressed) as well as global cooperation. 16 Both countries started to work on Theater 
Missile Defense system, which was intensified after 1998 launch of Teapodong missile by 
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North Korea. Despite some divergences U. S. -Japanese alliance was depicted as the core 
of American Global Security Strategy at the turn of the centuries. 17
17 R. Armitage, J. Nye (co-chairs of the study group), The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward 
a Mature Partnership - Report by bipartisan study group, 2000. Available at: http: //www. ndu. edu/inss/strforum/ 
SR_01/SR_Japan. htm. 
18 See: D. Fouse, Japan and the United States 2004-2005: Going Global? [in: ] Special Assessment: The 
Asia-Pacific and the United States 2004-2005, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu 2005; see 
also: C. Hughes, Japan s Security Policy, the US-Japan Alliance, and the ‘War on Terror: ' Incrementalism 
Confirmed or Radical Leap?, “Australian Journal of International Affairs, ” vol. 58, no. 4, December 2004. 
19 See: R. Kemacs, The Future of U. S. Relations with Japan and China: Will Bilateral Relations Survive 
the New American Unilateralism?, “Asia-Pacific Perspectives: An Electronic Journal, ” vol. 4, no. 1, May 2004. 
Available at: http: //www. pacificrim. usfca. edu/research/perspectives. 
20 See: E. Heginbotham, C. Twomey, Americas Bismarckian Asia Policy, “Current History, ” vol. 104, 
no. 683, September 2005. 
21 See: M. Green, S. Koizumi, U. S. -Japan Relations: Abe Shows the Right Stuff, “Comparative Connec­
tions: A Quarterly E-Joumal on East Asian Bilateral Relations, ” vol. 8, no. 4, January 2007. 
22 Japan promised to provide $ 67 million to help fight avian flu and other pandemic diseases and to 
strengthening maritime security. It also started youth exchange initiative (worth $ 315 million over the next five 
years). R. Cossa, B. Glosserman, Regional Overview: Renewed Hope in the Year of the Golden Pig, “Com­
parative Connections: A Quarterly E-Joumal on East Asian Bilateral Relations, ” vol. 9, no. 1, April 2007. 
Currently we should focus on couple of the issues. Japan remains very a close U. S. 
ally in East Asia. The U. S. is working closely with Japan on security issues. We could 
observe it during the second Gulf War, when Japan sent Self Defense Force to give logis­
tical support and sent Ground Self Defense Force to support the reconstruction of Iraq and 
humanitarian aid (which required constitutional changes). Cooperation in the National 
Missile Defense and Theater Missile Defense is also closer. 18 The close cooperation stemmed 
from very strong personal relations between Prime Minister Koizumi and President Bush. 
On the other hand it faced strong opposition in Japanese public opinion traditionally driven 
by pacifist sentiments and anti-Americanism. 19
We should also focus on Japanese relations with its Asian neighbors. On one hand 
Koizumi’s relations with Washington were very good, on the other hand, his political be­
havior caused many problems especially in relations with Japan’s neighbors. These in­
cluded problems with China about historical matters, especially Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni 
Shrine, Japanese commemorating of Japan’s war dead (including class-A war criminals). 
There is also problem of history textbooks and Diaoyou tai/Senekaku Islands. Dispute 
with Korea over the fishing-rich Liancourt Rocks (Dok-do/Take-shima) inflamed bilateral 
conflict. Escalating conflicts with its neighbors and growing Japanese nationalism were 
dangerous not only to Japan, but also to the U. S., as it’s crucial Asian ally would be more 
and more alienated in Asia, hence reducing U. S. influence in the region. 20
The politics of the newly-appointed Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is different. In Octo­
ber 2006 he paid visits to the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Korea. Abe 
and Hu agreed in Beijing on working together to prevent North Korea from further devel­
oping of its nuclear programs, accelerate talks on disputes over natural resource explora­
tion in the East China Sea, and launch a joint study on history. In Seoul Abe and Roh 
condemned North Korean nuclear programs. 21 Additionally Japan expands its aid and 
exchange programs with Southeast Asian countries and works on the Comprehensive Part­
nership Agreement with ASEAN countries. 22 The aforementioned are definitely good signs 
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for the U. S., as its most important ally is developing better relations in the region. On the 
other hand those relations may be used for Japan’s own purposes, as it prefers regional 
trade arrangements than U. S. proposed Asia-Pacific Free Trade Area. 
Sino-American relations
Japan is perceived as the crucial U. S. ally in East Asia, whereas People’s Republic of 
China, as a potential strategic adversary. 23 During the Cold War we could observe the 
strategic triangle - the United States, the Soviet Union and the Peoples’ Republic of China 
playing on the grand chessboard. 
23 The Commission on America’s National Interests, p. 24. 
24 See: M. Oksenberg, The China Problem, “Foreign Affairs, ” Summer 1991; R. Garson, The United 
States and China since 1949: A Troubled Affair, London: Printer Publishers, 1994, pp. 200-08. 
25 See: D. Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U. S. -China Relations, 1989-2000, Berke­
ley: University of California Press, 2001, p. 33. 
26 One of its main purposes was to maintain constructive relations with great powers, both allies and 
former foes, such as China and Russia, for the sake of their importance for U. S. security and prosperity. See: 
D. Shambaugh, Containment or Engagement of China? Calculating Beijing s Responses, “International Secu­
rity, ” vol. 21, no. 2, Autumn 1996. 
Sino-U. S. relations were relatively smooth in the 1980s. The breakdown of the rela­
tionship was an effect of the Tiananmen Square massacre that took place on June 4th, 
1989, followed by the international sanctions. 
China’s situation radically changed after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. 
It was mainly China that was to decide whether the UN Security Council would accept 
international intervention in Iraq. Chinese authorities saw the advantages of returning to 
the world stage as a country supporting solutions consistent with international law. China 
didn’t support the use of force, but didn’t use the right of veto, either. 24
Clinton entered the White House as a politician who would firmly place the problems 
of human rights or WMD proliferation on his agenda. Nomination of Winston Lord, 
a well-known critic of the Beij ing regime, to Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and 
Pacific Affairs seemed to indicate a tightening of the China policy. But even before his 
inauguration, Clinton met with Bush and said: “We have a big stake in not isolating China, 
in seeing that China continues to develop a market economy. ”25
Beginning in 1993, the “comprehensive (constructive) engagement” strategy was ap­
plied. It worked on the assumption that developing social and economic contacts with 
China was reasonable and would lead to consolidation of the liberalizing tendencies in this 
country, even though its achievements in the field of human rights were not satisfying. This 
gradual easing of tensions in bilateral relations was also an element of, developed further 
in 1996, the strategy of “engagement and enlargement. ”26
Despite the “comprehensive engagement” strategy and the steady progress in bilateral 
relations, the next two years were very difficult for both countries, mainly because of the 
“Taiwan problem. ” The strongest episode of the confrontation over the Taiwan Strait was 
the Chinese maneuvers on the eve of the first democratic presidential election in Taiwan. 
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The U. S. reacted very firmly, sending a strong fleet (including two aircraft carrier groups) 
to the region. 27
27 See: R. Ross, The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force, 
“International Security, ” vol. 25, no. 2, Fall 2000; M. O’Hanlon, Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan, “Interna­
tional Security, ” vol. 25, no. 2, Fall 2000. 
28 See: Remarks by President Clinton and President Jiang Zemin at Arrival Ceremony, The White House
1997. Available at: http: //usinfo. state. gov/regional/ea/uschina/jiangarv. htm. 
29 The wide range of issues encompassed: reprogramming nuclear weapons not to target each other; begin­
ning negotiations about Chinese joining the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR); agreements dealing 
with export of chemical and biological weapons and anti-personnel landmines; creation of a direct presidential 
link to communicate more effectively; and consultation concerning regional stability, especially on the Korean 
Peninsula and in the Middle East. See Fact Sheet, Achievements of U. S. -China Summit, The White House
1998. Available at: http: //clinton5. nara. gov/textonly/WH/New/China/19980627-7898. html. 
30 See: H. Harding, American China Policy under the Bush Administration: Change and Continuity [in: ] 
A. Rosenbaum (ed. ), U. S. -China Relations and the Bush Administration: a New Paradigm or Continuing 
Modalities, Claremont: Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies, 2003, pp. 68-69. 
31 See: S. Zhao, Chinese Nationalism and Its Foreign Policy Ramifications [in: ] Ch. Marsh, J. Dreyer 
(eds), U. S. -China Relations in the Twenty-First Century: Policies, Prospects and Possibilities, Lanham: Lex­
ington Books, 2003, pp. 70-78. 
32 See: D. Bachman, The United States and China: Rhetoric and Reality, “Current History, ” September 
2001. 
At the 1997 APEC summit in the Philippines, Clinton and Jiang agreed to Jiang’s visit 
to Washington and a summit meeting in Shanghai in 1998. During Jiang’s visit, both presi­
dents focused on the role of bilateral cooperation in the world (the problems of security, 
ecology, etc. ). 28 More detailed arrangements were made in 1998 during Clinton’s visit to 
Shanghai. 29 Furthermore, what was very important to China was that president Clinton 
announced his so-called “three nos policy” doctrine, in which he stated that the U. S. would 
not support: the independence of Taiwan; the two Chinas (or one China, one Taiwan) 
policy; or the membership of Taiwan in international organizations comprising solely sov­
ereign states. 30
Bilateral relations became more complicated after the May 1999 bombing of the Chi­
nese embassy in Belgrade. It resulted in anti-American riots in China. The riots, however, 
were soon stopped, because they could be a threat to authority, and the Chinese had re­
ceived an official apology and compensation for the bombing. 31
The situation improved in November, when the agreement concerning Chinese entry to 
the WTO was signed (it had been discussed during the APEC summit in New Zealand). 
On October 10, 2000, Bill Clinton established the Permanent Normal Trade Relations 
with China, which was the condition of Chinese membership in the World Trade Organiza­
tion. W- W
The presidential election in 2000 seemed to be a kind of turning point in bilateral 
relations. “The strategic partnership” with China, as it was called by President Clinton and 
his administration, was replaced with the term “strategic competition” by G. W. Bush’s 
team. Researchers have pointed out that this declared policy was only an attempt to show 
the differences between the current and former administration. 32
An important change in the strategic situation of the PRC was the aftermath of the 
September 11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and the “war 
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on terrorism” that stemmed from them. As Strobe Talbot wrote, the U. S. administration, 
which had been looking for a new enemy to replace the Soviet Union, didn’t have to look 
any further. It found it, and it was global terrorism. 33
33 S. Talbot, U. S. -China Relations in the Changing World [in: ] Ch. Marsh, J. Dreyer, op. cit., p. 8. 
34 See: C. Dalpino, M. Pei, Beijing’s Chance to Forge True Alliance, “South China Morning Post, ” Sep­
tember 19, 2001. Available at: http: //www. brookings. edu/views/op-ed/dalpino/20010918. htm. 
35 See: K. Dumbaugh, China-U. S. Relations: Current Issues and Implications for U. S. Policy, CRS Re­
port for Congress, February 14, 2007. Available at: http: //www. opencrs. com. 
36 See: J. Ikenberry, American Hegemony and East Asian Order, “Australian Journal of International 
Affairs, ” vol. 58, no. 3, September 2004. 
37 See: E. Medeiros, Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia-Pacific Stability, “The Washington Quar­
terly, ” vol. 29, no. 1, Winter 2005-2006. 
A couple of days after the terrorist attack, the Chinese president Jiang Zemin called 
President Bush and promised wide support and cooperation in fighting against world ter­
rorism. The Chinese help perhaps was not very important from a military point of view, but 
China was a permanent member of the UN Security Council, hence it could facilitate the 
American action. On the other hand, through its participation in the anti-terrorist coalition 
China wanted to justify its campaign against Muslim Uyghurs inhabiting the Xinjiang 
Autonomous Region. 34
Current Problems in the Sino-American relations include: violations of intellectual 
property rights in China (it is estimated that 90% of products in China violate property 
rights), currency valuation, which is perceived as one of the main reasons of huge trade 
deficit in U. S. -PRC trade. The U. S. accuses China of undervaluing its currency and threat­
ens with economic sanctions. In 2005 China changed the valuation method, pegging Yuan 
to the basket of currencies, which resulted in a small appreciation of the RMB. Other 
serious tensions are connected with Taiwan and U. S. arms sales to the island. Tradition­
ally, human rights issue is on the agenda. Pentagon expresses also concerns about growing 
Chinese military budget. On the other hand the U. S. and the PRC cooperate closely in 
Six-Party talks aiming at closing North Korean nuclear program. One should stress also 
establishing U. S. -China Strategic Economic Dialogue in December 2006. Another U. S. 
concern is Chinese “good neighborhood” policy, resulting in increasing Chinese influence 
in East Asian countries, but also diplomatic offensive in South America, Middle East and 
Africa. 35 The latter may be dangerous for American hegemony in the region in particular 
and, on the long run, in the world. 
Regional architecture
The Asia-Pacific is the biggest geopolitical region in the world, wherein bunch of inter­
national organizations exist. U. S. policy in the region is based on the traditional hub- 
-and-spoke structure of bilateral alliances, and the support for multilateral institutions is 
relatively limited. Such structure is perceived as obsolete, but the assessments of its per­
spectives are different. Some scholars maintain that such structure will last for the next 
decades, 36 some see decreasing role of the U. S. and the coming hegemonic role of China. 37 
Figure 1 shows the most important elements of the regional architecture. 
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Fig. 1. East Asian Regional Arrangements - Existing and Proposed
Source: D. Nanto, East Asian Regional Achitecture: New Economic and Security Arrangements and 
U. S. Policy, CRS Report for Congress, Washington 2006. 
If taking into account the U. S. interests, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, cre­
ated in 1989, seem to be the most important organization. 38 Its role was appreciated in 
1993, when the U. S. hosted first APEC Summit in Seattle. As a Polish scholar E. Halizak 
wrote, APEC is treated as a basic instrument of the American policy in the region, acting 
as a tool of liberalizing the trade and investment in the region, increasing chances of U. S. 
companies, preventing the creation of the East Asian trading block, binding institutionally 
East Asia and North America, legitimizing U. S. presence in the Asia-Pacific Region. 39 
Since the Asian Economic Crisis (1997-1998), however, APEC’s role started to diminish, 
as this organization could not respond to the crisis appropriately. It also seem to lose its 
breath, 40 especially in achieving the so called Bogor goals, by pursuing free trade and 
investment till 2010 (2020 for less developed economies). 41
38 It stemmed from the initiative undertaken by group of scholars, who had started to meet in 1968 as 
Pacific Free Trade and Development Conference (PAFTAD). The group gave intellectual impact on Australian 
and Japanese foreign policy makers. The U. S. was relatively reluctant to join the first ministerial meeting that 
took place in Canberra, but finally decided to participate. See: H. Patrick, From PAFTAD to APEC: Economists 
Networks and Public Policy Making, Discussion Paper no. 2, Columbia University APEC Study Center. Avail­
able at: www. columbia. edu. 
39 E. Haliżak, Stosunki międzynarodowe w rejonie Azji i Pacyfiku, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe 
Scholar, 1999, p. 143. 
40 To achieve the Bogor goals, Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalization emerged in APEC. This initiative 
encountered serious problems in APEC and revealed the crisis within APEC. See: M. Wesley, APECs Mid-Life 
Crisis?: The Rise and Fall of Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalization, “Pacific Affairs, ” vol. 74, no. 2, Sum­
mer 2001. 
41 Economic Leaders’ Declaration said: “We are determined to pursue free and open trade and investment 
in the Asia-Pacific in a manner that will encourage and strengthen trade and investment liberalization in the 
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Economic attitude of APEC changed in 2001, when the Economic Leaders assembled 
in Shanghai decided to issue the statement on counter-terrorism, which was regarded as 
the rising influence of the U. S. and extra-economic factor in the organization. 42 The role of 
the APEC in the region is gradually diminishing. 
world as a whole. Thus, the outcome of trade and investment liberalization in the Asia-Pacific will not only be 
the actual reduction of barriers among APEC economies but also between APEC economies and non-APEC 
economies. ” See: APEC Economic Leaders' Declaration of Common Resolve, Bogor, Indonesia, November 
15, 1994. Available at: http: //www. apecsec. org. sg/apec/leaders_declarations/1994. html. 
42 See: APEC Leaders ’ Statement on Counter-Terrorism, Shanghai, People’s Republic of China, October 
21, 2001. Available at: http: //www. apecsec. org. sg/content/apec/leaders_daclarations/2001 /statement_on_counter- 
terrorism. html. 
43 R. Sutter, The United States and Asia in 2005’. Managing Troubles, Sustaining Leadership, “Asian 
Survey, ” vol. 46, issue 1, 2006. 
44 China changed its policy especially since Asian Economic Crisis, using moderate approaches to territo­
rial disputes, accession to Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (what U. S. refuses to sign), accepting the so-called 
ASEAN way, and signing the China-ASEAN FTA. See: Jing-dong Yuan, China-ASEAN Relations: Perspec­
tives, Prospects and Implications for U. S. Interests, Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006, passim. 
45 See: B. Vaughn, East Asian Summit: Issues for Congress, CRS Report for Congress, Washington 2005. 
46 China was initially attempting not to include India, Australia and New Zealand into the summit, but 
failed to keep them down. This attempt failed as well. See: M. Malik, The East Asia Summit, “Australian 
Journal of International Affairs, ” vol. 60, no. 2, June 2006. 
47 See: Chairman s Statement of the First East Asia Summit, Kuala Lumpur, December 14, 2005. Avail­
able at: http: //www. aseansec. Org/l 8104. htm. 
48 See: Joint Press Statement on Follow-Up to the ASEAN-U. S. Enhanced Partnership, 17 November 
2006. Available at: http: //www. aseansec. org/18955. htm. 
While the role of the APEC is lessening and trans-Pacific economic community seems 
to vanish, another regional institution - ASEAN is emerging as a dominant organization of 
the East Asia. It is definitely dangerous to the United States, as it precludes this country as 
a part of the Asia-Pacific. Moreover, it focuses on the East Asia, where the U. S. is unnec­
essary. It somehow stems from the U. S. policy, which preoccupied with other problems in 
different regions of the world forgot about its interests in the Asia-Pacific. 43 It was the 
People’s Republic of China that took advantage of the gap building close relations with 
ASEAN. 44
The danger became palpable when the first East Asia Summit was organized in Kuala 
Lumpur in 2005. The event (as a part of rising both Asian regionalism and China’s rising 
influence) was perceived by the U. S. analysts as a challenge to the central role of the U. S. 
in setting the agenda and shaping goals in the region. The East Asia Summit was perceived 
as an instrument that, led by China, would exclude the U. S. and displace APEC as the 
leading force in the region. 45 These fears did not come fully true when the ASEAN coun­
tries invited other big states to participate in the East Asia Summit, which aimed at balanc­
ing Chinese influence. 46 Finally ASEAN was recognized as a driving force for the East 
Asia Summit. 47
The United States, realizing the danger, undertook some countermeasures. Those in­
clude mainly two initiatives that address multilateral institutions of the region. First of 
them is the ASEAN-U. S. Enhanced Partnership 20 06-2011. 48 The plan focuses on good 
governance, transparency, protection of intellectual property rights, aid to small and me­
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dium enterprises, and U. S. assistance to ASEAN public health activities. 49 The other ini­
tiative was made during the APEC Summit in Hanoi in November 2006. President Bush 
proposed the creation the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific and APEC leaders agreed to 
study the project as a potential long-term goal for APEC50. Both initiatives aim at prevent­
ing U. S. exclusion from its regional leader position. 
49 See: S. Simon, U. S. -Southeast Asian Relations: Bush Reaches Out at APEC, “Comparative Connec­
tions: A Quarterly E-Joumal on East Asian Bilateral Relations, ” vol. 8, no. 4, January 2007. 
50 See: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 2006, Fact Sheet, White House Office of the Press 
Secretary, November 19, 2006. Available at: http: //www. state. gOv/p/eap/rls/76318. htm. 
The period discussed in this article may be viewed as a loop of American policy to­
wards the region. We could observe the increasing role of the Asia-Pacific region in the 
U. S. policy, and, first and foremost, the rising understanding of the role in early nineties. 
Then, preoccupation with other issues and regions prevailed. Finally, we may see, the 
initiatives that address the East Asia, not only in American way (understood here as an 
obsolete “hub-and-spoke” system), but also in the way the East Asian countries prefer 
(including stronger cooperation with multilateral institutions). The latter is successfully 
implemented by the People’s Republic of China and may be used by the U. S. as well. The 
upcoming years will show whether the U. S. will maintain its hegemonic position in the 
region, and if its current initiatives will be fruitful. 
Marcin Grabowski is a Ph. D. candidate at the Institute of American Studies and Polish 
Diaspora of the Jagiellonian University. He has been working on the dissertation The 
United States and the Economic Integration of the Pacific Rim since 1989, with a Spe­
cial Focus on APEC and ASEAN. His M. A. thesis Sino-American Relations since 1989 
won the II award in the Contest of Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Best M. A. 
Thesis in Contemporary International Relations. Marcin’s research interests focus on the 
Asia-Pacific Rim, U. S. and Chinese foreign policy and the international economic rela­
tions. He is also actively involved in third sector activities, supporting the European Stu­
dents’ Forum AEGEE. 

